This blog post reflects on themes and discussions from the The Integrity of the Human Species: Comparative Legal Perspectives event, held on 18 May 2026
The Integrity of the Human Species: Comparative Legal Perspectives
by Naz Gün (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales –Centre Georg Simmel, France)
The French Civil Code contains a distinctive concept, namely the idea that “no one may infringe upon the integrity of the human species” (art.16-4). Introduced in 1994, this notion is unusual. Rather than focusing only on individual rights or dignity, French law seems to protect humanity as a collective biological and moral entity. In practice, this principle prohibits eugenic practices, reproductive cloning, and germline genome editing. Yet, despite its strong symbolic force, the law never defines what “the human species” means. It instead identifies forbidden practices, leaving the concept itself undefined.
Originally, “human species” comes from taxonomy, referring simply to Homo sapiens as a biological classification. But in law, the concept becomes normative, tied to human dignity, the continuity of humanity, and the moral limits of biotechnology. As such, French law does not borrow the concept directly from biology but it transforms it into a legal and ethical boundary.
International law played a major role in shaping this understanding. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights spoke of “the human family,” suggesting humanity as a shared moral community. The 1978 Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice moved closer to the language of a single human species, affirming the essential unity of the human race and the belonging of all human beings to a single species. This linked anti-racist thought to a broader vision of humanity united by common dignity. UNESCO and UN texts later developed an intergenerational dimension, asserting that present generations are responsible not only for
themselves but also for those yet to come.
The 1997 UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights described the human genome as the “heritage of humanity,” emphasising it cannot be treated as private property. The same year, the Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention explicitly referred to the human being as both an individual and a member of the human species. It restricted genetic interventions to preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic purposes while forbidding changes intended to alter descendants’ genomes. The 1998 Additional Protocol on cloning prohibited human cloning on the basis of dignity. European instruments such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights continued to condemn eugenics and cloning, linking them to dignity, responsibility, and science’s long-term consequences.
French domestic law translated these ideas into a concrete legal framework. Senators argued that molecular biology raises questions about both individuals and the future of the species, since changing one person’s genetic identity may affect descendants. The courts later confirmed that the integrity of the human species protects the constitutional dignity of the human person. In 2004, the concept entered the Criminal Code through offenses described as “crimes against the human species,” including eugenic practices aimed at selecting persons and reproductive cloning. French law thus uses the concept as a basis for criminal prohibition, not merely as a moral condemnation.
French law remains careful about definition. The Conseil d’État clarified that eugenic practices refer to systematic selection. Medically assisted reproduction may involve choices based on serious illness without becoming legally eugenic. The law is especially strict on cloning as both reproductive and therapeutic cloning are forbidden, though reproductive cloning is punished more severely. Parliamentary reports justified this prohibition through dignity and the uniqueness of each human being.
The United Kingdom reaches similar regulatory outcomes but through a different legal vocabulary. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act does not mention the “human species” but regulates assisted reproduction, embryo research, and genetic modification through licensing, safety, and oversight. Germline editing is permitted for research but prohibited for reproduction.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority supervises clinics and authorises research. In 2016, CRISPR-Cas9 studies on human embryos were authorised for research, but embryo transfer remained forbidden. In 2018, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics suggested reproductive genome editing might be ethically acceptable under strict conditions, if it protects future children and avoids discrimination.
British law also distinguishes therapeutic and reproductive cloning. Therapeutic cloning is allowed for research, while reproductive cloning is banned. Justifications focus less on dignity than in France and more on safety, fairness, and social consequences.
Thus, both French and British law prohibit the same practices, converging on biotechnology regulation despite different symbolic foundations. France speaks in terms of dignity and the integrity of the human species while the UK emphasises security, non-discrimination, and regulatory control. International law also condemns eugenics and cloning while leaving the human species undefined. The result is not a precise universal definition but a shared ethical intuition.
This suggests a broader bioethical lesson. Protecting future generations may require a precautionary approach, especially when genetic interventions have irreversible, hereditary effects. The debate resembles environmental law, where legal intervention often precedes full scientific certainty of harm, illustrating that the law can attribute legal personality to entities such as elements of nature in order to grant protection, even when the protected interest is collective, abstract, or oriented toward the future.
